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PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE IN A WORLD OF AMATEURS
Professor Thomas D. MorganThe George Washington University Law School
To be published in the Symposium Issue of the St. Mary’s Law Journal (2009)
________________
Abstract:   An increasing number of tasks once reserved to lawyers are now beingperformed by non-lawyers.  That reality seems likely to continue.  The question then becomesagainst what standard of performance such “amateur” practice should be assessed.  One answermight be that a non-lawyer should be guilty of malpractice if the work is performed below thelevel of quality to which a lawyer would be held.  This paper argues that the work should insteadbe judged against the standard of performance the non-lawyer purported to be able to deliver.
_________________
My purpose in this paper is to have us think about legal malpractice in a world that for lawyers is rapidly changing.  Our clients experience changes at an accelerating pace and expectus to be able to keep up.  Lawyers are simultaneously blessed and cursed by technology thatallows us to deliver services more quickly and in more places but keeps us tethered to our cellphones and email day and night.  Work we thought we did well for clients that we have knownseemingly forever is threatened by people promising to do the same work better, faster, cheaper,or all of these.  Such developments will inevitably affect how we view professional malpractice,if only in adapting the way we understand what constitutes the “competence and diligencenormally exercised by lawyers” that the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers says a
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1387088
1American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third): The Law Governing Lawyers § 52(1) (2000).  Iwas one of the  two Associate Reporters for this Restatement.2
lawyer is required to bring to bear on a client’s matter.1  What I want to do in this paper is focus on a related question.  I want to suggest that oneof the changes facing lawyers and their clients has been an increase in non-lawyer delivery ofwhat have traditionally been seen as legal services.  It is a trend that I believe is destined only toaccelerate.  The malpractice question then becomes: To what standard of care and competenceshould such “amateur” lawyers be held?Some Examples to Set the SceneThree fictional examples may help make concrete the kinds of situations I have in mind.  First, Chemco manufactures chemicals used by other firms to make a wide range of endproducts.  From time to time, when a consumer is injured by one of the end products, the plaintiffalso joins Chemco as a defendant.  Chemco self-insures such claims and has retained a companycalled QuickSettle to manage and try to settle the claims as they arise.  QuickSettle is composedentirely of non-lawyers – most of them former insurance company claims agents.  Chemco givesQuickSettle authority to settle cases for up to $50,000.  If a case cannot be settled within thatlimit, it is referred to a lawyer for possible trial, but most of the time, QuickSettle gets goodresults and Chemco has been very pleased.  Recently, however, a QuickSettle employeemistakenly filed a medical report from a case with severe injuries among the records in adifferent case with injuries that were much less severe.  The QuickSettle claims agent did notcatch the error and agreed on behalf of Chemco to settle what should have been a low value casefor a clearly excessive sum.  Chemco wants damages for QuickSettle’s negligence.
2This problem is based loosely on State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1976) (holds that writtendivorce kits with forms are not unauthorized practice, but personal conferences with clients are). 3
Second, Jerry and Martha James want a divorce.  They earn too much to qualify for legalaid but they cannot afford to hire private lawyers.  No children are involved, and there has beenno complication such as domestic violence.  But they both believe the marriage was a mistake,and they want out before things get more complicated.  Paul Palmer created DivorceMagic forjust such situations.  Palmer is not a lawyer, nor is anyone on his staff.  He was simply upsetabout how his own divorce was handled, so his DivorceMagic company publishes a 60-pagebook called “When Your Marriage Was a Mistake.”  The book is sold on-line for $49.  It offerscheck lists and forms that purport to allow lay people to obtain a divorce in any jurisdiction.  If acouple wants help filling out the forms, DivorceMagic will provide a non-lawyer employee to dothat as well for an additional $99.  Jerry and Martha bought the book.  They agreed on a propertydivision, that there would be no alimony, and they paid the extra $99 for a consultation abouthow to fill in the forms to record their agreement.2  Sure enough, the forms were enough to obtain a speedy divorce.  Jerry later learned,however, that a recent court decision in their state would have entitled him to be covered byMartha’s health insurance for a year after the divorce, at no additional cost to Martha, if thesettlement agreement incorporated in the divorce had so provided.  Now it is too late to correctthe situation.  The court decision had been the subject of CLE programs attended by manydivorce lawyers, although it is hard to say that all lawyers in the state would have known about it. In any event, the DivorceMagic book said nothing about the issue and the consultant who helpedwith the forms was also ignorant.  As a result, Jerry had to pay $4,500 out of pocket for his own
3This fact situation is based loosely on Bland v. Reed, 67 Cal.Rptr. 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (holds thatneither the union nor the advisor is liab le for malpractice). 
4This definition was used in ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 3–5 (1970).  4
health insurance and he now believes DivorceMagic owes him that sum.Third, Jose Ramos has been injured on the job and he is about to lose his house.  His stateallows non-lawyers to appear on behalf of claimants before the state Industrial Accident Boardseeking workers’ compensation benefits.  Ramos’ union representative recommended that Ramosconsult Maria Castro, a non-lawyer, to file his claim and obtain benefits for him.  Castro madethe filing in a timely manner and obtained the maximum award available for Ramos’ injury.  Shedid nothing, however, either to help Ramos file an additional action for negligence against thethird party who caused the injury or to renegotiate his mortgage so that he might have a chance ofkeeping his house.  Nor did Castro help Ramos find a lawyer who might provide such help. Ramos appreciated Castro’s help but believes she ultimately committed malpractice.3  Could Examples Like This Ever Happen?Three examples. Do they sound plausible?  We used to think that prohibitions of theunauthorized practice of law meant such that cases could not arise.  Each example involves worklawyers could have done.  Each involves applying legal principles to concrete facts involvingparticular clients, which is the traditional line non-lawyers may not cross.4   Yet such cases doarise and their number is likely to increase in the future.  Think about some reasons why.First, some of the services described in our three cases have long been held not to violateunauthorized practice of law prohibitions.  Writing and selling the DivorceMagic book, forexample, is not the practice of law.  The leading case involved Norman Dacey and his best-seller,
5New York County Lawyers Assn v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967). See also, In re Thompson, 574S.W.2d 365 (M o. 1978).
6Nor does a law professor practice law when teaching, because he or she teaches the law as it relates tohypothetical persons and does not give  advice to actual clients. 
7E.g., Bland v. Reed, 67 Cal.Rptr. 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (non-lawyer represented person beforeindustrial accident commission); Harkness v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Rev., 920 A.2d 162 (Pa. 2007)(non-lawyer may represent employer before unemployment compensation board of review). But see, AdvisoryOpinion HRS Non-lawyer Counselor, 547 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1989) (non-lawyers may not draft documents andrepresent government department in uncontested juvenile dependency proceedings).
8Executive Order 12988: Civil Justice Reform (Feb. 5, 1996).5
How to Avoid Probate,5 but we can be sure that many law school casebooks used at St. Mary’sare also not written by Texas-licensed lawyers and no one thinks that, even if a potential clientreads a casebook, the book’s author would be guilty of practicing without a license.6Likewise, Maria Castro’s representation of Jose Ramos before the workers’ compensationagency was likely not unauthorized practice. Several states now permit non-lawyer representationbefore state agencies7 and many federal agencies are required to make non-lawyer representationbefore those agencies possible as well.8 Further, while the activities of QuickSettle may be within most states’ current prohibitionof unauthorized practice, think about what is going on.  It is no accident that QuickSettle iscomposed of former insurance company employees.  Non-lawyer claims adjusters have been astaple of the insurance industry for years.  We have justified that on the grounds that it was theinsurance company’s money that was at risk and they could hire whomever they wanted to try toprotect it, but in our example Chemco is a self-insurer.  It could have hired the employees ofQuickSettle as its own employees to try to dispose of the cases. Compliance programs in manycorporations in areas such as environmental, human resources, tax, antitrust, and health andsafety are often under the direction of non-lawyer compliance officers who have access to
9See, e.g., Susan Hackett, Inside Out: An Examination of Demographic T rends in the In-House Profession,44 Ariz. L. Rev. 609, 616 (2002).  Professor Kritzer calls such non-lawyers “law workers” and sees them asexamples of the kinds of people with whom lawyers are likely to compete in the future.  See Herbert M. Kritzer, TheFuture Role of “Law Workers”: Rethinking the Forms of Legal Practice and the Scope of Legal Education, 44 Ariz.L. Rev. 917 (2002).  See also, HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS & ORDINARY LITIGATION(1990); HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGA L ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NON-LAWYERS AT WORK (1998).  But cf., Hipwellv. Kentucky B ar Ass’n, 267  S.W .3d 682 (Ky. 2008) (even corporate general counsel of company must be licensed inthe state in which the company is based).
10E.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Martin, 886 N.E.2d 827 (Ohio 2008) (franchised company called “We thePeople” violated unauthorized practice prohibition when it gave advice about completing legal pleadings and otherdocuments).
11The case was Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Technology, Inc., 1999 WL 47235 (N.D.Tex. 1999), which enjoined the sale of software that purported to help users select and complete legal forms.  TheTexas legislature then changed the result by statute, and the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction in light of the statute,179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).  See also, In re Reynoso, 477 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (lay seller of web-basedsoftware for preparation of bankruptcy forms is subject to regulations imposed on bankruptcy petition preparers andviolated California unauthorized practice of law prohibition).
12Probably the leading case is State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz.1961), supplemented 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962).  There, after the state supreme court held that filling in the blankson a real estate contract constituted the practice of law, the citizens of Arizona passed a ballot initiative amending thestate constitution to reverse the decision.  See also, Opinion No. 26 of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice ofLaw, 654 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1995) (real estate brokers handling entire closing of a real estate transaction does not6
lawyers but do not necessarily report to them,9 so it should not surprise us when courts start tosay that companies may use claims adjusters working through an entity such as QuickSettle. Finally, although DivorceMagic’s provision of non-lawyers to fill in the blanks on thepre-printed forms would also be unauthorized practice in most states because it involves makingjudgments about how legal standards apply to Jerry and Martha’s specific case,10 even that kindof prohibition is likely soon to break down.  Think of the typical real estate agent, for example,who every day fills in the blanks on forms for buyers’ offers and sellers’ counteroffers.  A lotmore than Jerry’s lost $4,500 turns on getting the terms right, but as those here in Texas whofollowed the controversy over Quicken Family Lawyer realize,11 we are well past the day in moststates where even people making the biggest purchase of their lives are required to have alawyer.12
constitute unauthorized practice of law); Dressel v. Ameribank, 664 N.W.2d 151 (M ich. 2003) (mortgage companymay charge fee for preparation and completion of home loan documents); Perkins v. CTX M ortgage Co., 969 P.2d93 (Wash. 1999) (same). But see, The Florida Bar v. Beach, 675 So.2d 106 (Fla .1996) (lawyer who consults withclients of a firm run by paralegals violates prohibitions against assisting the unauthorized practice of law and sharinglegal fee with non-lawyers); Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, 250 S.W.3d 697  (Mo. 2008) (mortgage brokermay not charge fee for preparation of mortgage documents); Franklin v. Chavis, 640 S.E.2d 873 (S.C. 2007) (fillingin blanks in computer-generated will form constituted unauthorized practice of law).
13State Bar of Michigan v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Mich. 1976) (Kavanagh, CJ, dissenting from holdingthat non-lawyer may not help clients fill in the blanks on forms in a divorce kit).7
There is an overarching reason, of course, why law and practice are making a lawyer’sinvolvement in traditional lawyer functions less required.  That reason is that our profession hastended to do a poor job of meeting many of the needs of potential clients.  Lay persons have longbeen entitled to act pro se, i.e., without any legal assistance, and many do so because they cannotafford several hundred dollars per hour for a lawyer’s time.  No state requires that its lawyersprovide pro bono service, and while some courts continue to defend the legal profession’s rightto prevent others from providing many kinds of services, other judges recognize that many clientsrequire a careful, caring friend more than a trained lawyer.  Chief Justice Kavanagh of Michiganput it well when he said in words that could apply to each of our examples: “[The] closed-shopattitude is utterly out of place in the modern world where claims pile high and much of the workof tracing and pursuing them requires the patience and wisdom of a layman rather than the legalskills of a member of the bar.”13Furthermore, the line between lawyer and non-lawyer work can be exceedingly fine.Lobbyists, for example, are often lawyers and often not.  Lawyers correctly believe that theirmalpractice policies cover work they do while lobbying, but even non-lawyers are not enjoinedfrom engaging in lobbying on behalf of others.  Sports agents and mediators similarly use skillslawyers possess but are often non-lawyers.  In this paper, we have talked about examples
14Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care for the UnlicensedPractice of Law, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 87 (2007). This subject has only rarely been examined in the scholarly literature,and Professor B uhai deserves great praise for her excellent, thorough review of the cases.  See also, Cornelia W allisHonchar, Evolving Standards of Non-lawyer Liability, 6 Prof. Law. 14 (May 1995) (an earlier, much shorter reviewof the issues, but one that also teased out key questions before others appreciated their importance). 
15730 So.2d 329 (Fla. Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1999). 8
traditionally handled only by lawyers, but one of the implications of getting into this subject isthe realization that more and more situations require multiple skills and that pressure is likelyonly to grow to have non-lawyers as well as lawyers available to handle them. To What Standard of Performance Should a Non-lawyer Be Held?The purpose of this paper in this symposium, of course, is more than just to convince youof the possibility that non-lawyers might provide what are otherwise legal services. The moreimportant question for us is to what standard of performance or care such a non-lawyer should beheld.  The most obvious possible answer to that question is the one offered in an excellent articleby Professor Sande Buhai of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. “Act Like a Lawyer,” ProfessorBuhai asserts, “Be Judged Like a Lawyer.”14 There are good arguments in favor of demanding that non-lawyers meet the standard towhich a lawyer is held.  First, the purpose of unauthorized practice prohibitions is said to be toprotect the public against unqualified practitioners.  Clients, we argue, have a right to expect thatwhen they seek help with legal issues, they will get help from someone fully qualified to performthe services.  The fact we might not always require a license to deliver a service should notdiminish the client’s right to enforce a standard of lawyer-quality work.Buscemi v. Intachai,15 a Florida case, illustrates the powerful instinct behind such a rule. Buscemi, a financial planner with a legal education but not a license to practice law, advised a
16Id. at 330.
17Id. The lawyer-quality standard is the one used in the state of W ashington, the jurisdiction that has mostfully considered the question. See, e.g., Jones v. Allstate Insurance Co., 45 P.3d 1068 (Wash. 2002) (claims adjusterwho advised accident victim held to same standard of care as a practicing lawyer); Bowers v. Transamerica T itle Ins.Co., 675 P.2d 193 (W ash. 1983) (non-lawyer who prepared closing documents held to same standard of care as alawyer).  Cf., Marks v. Estate of Marks, 957 P.2d 235 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (non-lawyer held subject to lawyerprofessional disciplinary rule p rohibiting lawyer preparation of will giving gift to organization in which lawyer isinterested).  Courts in Kansas have reached the same result, e.g., Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 553 P.2d254 (Kan. 1976); Webb v. Pomeroy, 655 P.2d 465 (Kan Ct. App. 1982).9
couple that it would be in their financial interest – and that of their dependent child – if theyobtained a divorce.  He helped them fill out the necessary forms and divide their existingproperty, but he failed to obtain either alimony or child support for the wife.  She wasunderstandably upset.  The defendant had discouraged the couple from hiring attorneys and thewife said she trusted him because: “Number one, he’s graduate from law school. Number two,he’s a financial advisor. * * *  I trust him and since he charge two hundred, I think that’sreasonable and he said it’s easy to get divorce, so I expect him to take care of everything.”16 Buscemi said that as a non-lawyer he could not be expected to perform as well as a lawyer.  Thecourt disagreed.  “Appellant overlooks the fact that whether a lawyer or not, if he undertakes togive legal advice, he is subject to a standard of due care.”17 Second, enforcement of a standard of lawyer-quality performance should tend to deternon-lawyers from undertaking the representation in the first place.  Unauthorized practicecommittees tend to give off a somewhat embarrassing odor of self-interestedness.  If we want toreserve tasks to lawyers without being obvious about what we are doing, one way to do it wouldbe to hold all providers to a standard that lawyers can confidently meet but that non-lawyerssometimes might not.  
18623 S.W .2d 823 (Ark. 1981).
19Id. at 826.
20ABA Model Rule 6.1 is the only rule in which “should” replaces “shall” as the relevant standard.  TheABA House of Delegates has consistently refused to recommend mandatory pro bono service, and while courts oftenpraise lawyers who do it, none have seen fit to require it other than in specific “appointed counsel” cases.10
An argument to this effect is found in Wright v. Langdon,18 where a real estate brokerwho prepared a contract of sale had miscalculated the payments needed to allow the seller to payoff a mortgage and the buyer to get good title.  In assessing his conduct, the court said, “[R]easonurges that the standard should be no less than that required of a licensed attorney, andconceivably an even higher standard would be appropriate–strict liability, for example, to deterthose who might be otherwise tempted to profess a competence they have no right to claim.”19Non-lawyers Should Instead Be Held to a Standard of Keeping Their PromisesBut however reasonable the “act like a lawyer, be judged like a lawyer” principle mayinitially seem, my object in this paper is to suggest that non-lawyers should not be held to thestandard of performance of a lawyer.  The primary reason is this: One reason we tend to look theother way when non-lawyers delivers services at all is that lawyers are often too costly for manyconsumers to afford.  No state has required lawyers to provide pro bono service,20 and the amountof service lawyers voluntarily perform falls well short of meeting client needs.  Further, there is little reason to believe that non-lawyers will not do a good job of meetingthe needs of most clients.  In tax preparation, real estate services, and countless other areas, thereare few cases where lack of competence has been a serious problem.  As Professor DeborahRhode has noted, “it is not self-evident that professional certification or supervision insures
21Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis ofUnauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 87 (1981).
22Mine is not the argument sometimes seen that a non-lawyer can never be guilty of lawyer malpractice.E.g., Divine v. Giancola, 635 N.E.2d 581 (Ill.App.1st Dist. 1994); Palmer v. W estmeyer, 549 N.E.2d 1202 (Ohio Ct.App. 1988).  Such cases get stuck on the term “lawyer” instead of focusing on the term “malpractice.”  All can agreethat non-lawyers are not lawyers without immunizing non-lawyers from liability for their negligence or othermalfeasance.  On the other hand, in some cases, courts simply hold that non-lawyers, such as those working for aunion, have no personal duty to union members complaining about the quality of their representation. E.g., UnitedSteelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Craig, 571 So.2d 1101 (Ala. 1990).
23Professor B uhai addresses this issue by applying the term “unauthorized” practice to such imposters, whilereserving the term “unlicensed” practice for practitioners of other disciplines who provide legal services as part oftheir work.  Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care for the UnlicensedPractice of Law, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 87, 88-89 (2007).  One example of such an imposter-lawyer is found in Tegmanv. Accident & Medical Investigations, Inc., 30 P.3d 8 (W ash. Ct. App. 2001), remanded 75 P.3d 497 (Wash. 2003).11
special competence.”21  If we set the performance bar artificially high by imposing damages fornot meeting lawyer professional standards, in short, the likely result is not that lawyers will stepin to meet the need, but that clients will be more likely to go unserved.22Instead of holding non-lawyers to a tort standard that treats them as if they were lawyers, I suggest we move toward a contract-based standard that asks what the non-lawyer purported tobe competent to do and whether she met a client’s reasonable expectations about the services tobe provided.  The burden of proof would initially be on the plaintiff client, and the non-lawyerdefendant could show specific disclaimers of experience or limits on work that would be done.In applying such a standard, non-lawyers should be required to identify themselves assuch.  Anyone who impersonates a lawyer should be held to the standard of lawyer performanceon the basis of an implied promise to deliver the services a lawyer can be expected to provide.23 Similarly, a client whose work is done by a paralegal or other non-lawyer that the client knowsworks for or under the supervision of a lawyer should be entitled to expect that the work will bedone to the standard the client can expect from the lawyer for whom the paralegal works.
24320 P .2d 16 (Cal. 1958).  The holding of the case focuses on liability of the non-lawyer to the beneficiaryof the will in question; one must infer  the standard of liability the court contemplated. See also , Buscemi v. Intachai,730  So.2d 329, 330 (Fla . Ct. App.1999) (“whether a lawyer or not, if [anyone] undertakes to give legal advice, he issubject to a standard of due care”). Cf. Kronzer v. First Nat’l Bank, 235 N.W.2d 187 (M inn. 1975) (even if bankofficer engaged in unauthorized practice in helping person prepare trust liable, bank not held to standard ofnegligence per se). 
25320 P.2d at 18.
2667 Cal.Rptr. 859 (1968).
2767 Cal.Rptr. at 861. 12
But beyond that, I believe that my proposed standard for self-acknowledged independentnon-lawyers doing things lawyers do as well is consistent with the result reached in California’sBiakanja v. Irving24 where a notary public had prepared a will for a client.  While I have toconcede that the court was ambiguous about the standard it was applying, in upholding thefinding of liability the court focused on the fact that the notary had “agreed and undertook toprepare a valid will” that “was invalid because defendant negligently failed to have it properlyattested.”25  In short, liability turned on the fact that the will’s invalidity was inconsistent with thenotary’s “undertaking” or agreement to prepare a valid instrument. The proposed standard is perhaps best illustrated, however, by Bland v. Reed,26 where aninjured steel worker had been represented before the state industrial accident commission by aunion-recommended non-lawyer.  The representation had led to a good award, but neither thenon-lawyer nor the union had recommended that the worker also sue the company whosenegligence caused his injury.  In denying a cause of action for the failure to advise the separatelawsuit, the court noted that “Reed was not a lawyer and appellant knew it.”27  The Californialegislature had expressly permitted non-lawyer representation before the commission, and theprovider did that job well.  The court went on: “we consider it improper to hold a non-lawyer
2867 Cal.Rptr. at 862.
29623 S.W.2d 823 (Ark. 1981).  See text accompanying n. 18.
30E.g., Barnes v. Turner, 606 S .E.2d 849 (Ga. 2004) (lawyer who filed  security document for client must tellthe client when and how to renew the filing); Wood v. McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C., 589 N.W.2d 103(Neb. 1999) (lawyer failed to tell divorce client she might be entitled to some of her husband’s unvested stockoptions). But see, Darby & Darby, P.C. v. VSI International, Inc., 739 N .E.2d 744 (N.Y. 2000) (lawyer need  not tellclient about possibility of insurance coverage for costs of the litigation).13
practicing before the Commission to a lawyer’s degree of care – particularly when the negligencecharged in not in respect * * * of the claim before the Commission.”28Thinking back, then, to the examples with which this paper began, even under my “dowhat you promise” standard, QuickSettle should be liable to Chemco for the clerical error thatled to the excessive payment.  Managing paper flow is presumably among the things claimsadjusters purport to do best.  One need not adopt the standard of performance of a lawyer to findthat QuickSettle failed to live up to the standard of performance its client had a right to expect.  My principle is also consistent with Wright v. Langdon, the case discussed earlier inwhich the real estate broker miscalculated the required payments.29  Lawyers are no better atpayment calculation than real estate brokers, and the essence of the case is clearly that the brokerfailed to do what his clients had every right to expect the broker had undertaken to do.Similarly, the proposed principle explains our example in which Maria Castro representedJose Ramos ably before the compensation commission but failed also alert him to his right to sueto redress the negligence of the third party wrongdoer.  Sometimes cases have held that a lawyermust tell the client about matters beyond the express subject about which the lawyer was hired,30 but what I am arguing is that so long as a non-lawyer does what she promises to do, she shouldnot be liable for failing to do more.
31730 So.2d 329 (Fla. Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1999).  See text accompanying nn. 15-17.
32This standard seems to me consistent with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A that a professional ortradesperson must perform to the standard “normally possessed by members” of the profession or trade in similarcircumstances “unless [the person] represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge.”14
Of course, there is always the problem with a proposal such as mine that clients will notunderstand what the non-lawyer is promising to do and how that compares to the level of servicesomeone else might provide.  Buscemi v. Intachai, the Florida case discussed earlier,31 presentsthat problem in a particularly poignant form.  That was the case in which the financial plannerobtained the promised divorce but left the wife without alimony or child support.  In that case,the financial planner had specifically required the clients to sign a document saying they knew hewas not a lawyer and could not give legal advice.  However, the court held – I believe wisely –that Buscemi in fact gave legal advice and created an expectation he would do so competently.  In short, the burden of proof should be placed on the service provider to live up to thepromises he or she explicitly or implicitly makes.32  It should not be hard to make the promisesclearly – on signs, in engagement agreements, in brochures, and in the course of actual dealings. The level of detail required in explanation should vary depending on the sophistication of theclient or the client’s representative.  A corporate general counsel hiring QuickSettle will needless explanation than an injured employee seeking compensation.  Indeed, I believe, contrary tosome cases cited here, that as well as telling their clients what they will do and are not competentto do, if other services may be necessary to protect an unsophisticated clients’ interests morefully, a non-lawyer should be required to say so and suggest who might provide the services.The hardest example I have posed was that of DivorceMagic whose book and advisor didnot talk about the recent decision that could have protected the husband’s right to remain covered
33ABA Model Rule 1.8(h). 15
by his ex-wife’s health insurance for an additional year.  The hypothetical assumed that the non-lawyers did not know what at least most divorce lawyers would have known, and my standardwould not automatically hold DivorceMagic to the lawyer standard.  To that extent at least, then,I have to acknowledge the possibility of “second class” service for clients of non-lawyers.  Onecould analogize this situation to Buscemi, of course, and say that DivorceMagic had implicitlycontracted to provide full service but I think that would stretch the truth.  The fact is that lawyerscan often do a sufficiently better job than non-lawyers that my standard may leave some clientswith a reduced standard of protection.  I suggest – and leave to others’ evaluation, however – thatnon-lawyer representation will on balance tend to be better than no representation at all.  And thelatter, I fear, will be many potential clients’ only realistic alternative to non-lawyer assistance. A Note on the Broader Implication of My ProposalIf the only point of this article were to illuminate a small corner of the world involvingpractice by non-lawyers, it would hardly be worth the effort.  I believe, however, that the analysisand my proposed standard sheds light on what may be an evolving contract standard ofmalpractice in cases involving lawyers.  While a lawyer may not disclaim competence to handlecases he or she undertakes and ask a client for a waiver of malpractice liability,33 under ABAModel Rule 1.2(c), with client consent, a lawyer may limit the scope of representation.  If alawyer wishes to help a client get a divorce but not take responsibility for tax implications of thesettlement, for example, Rule 1.2(c) expressly permits that arrangement. That is a huge analytic exception from the traditional idea of a clear, uniform standard oflawyer performance.  It has been necessitated, however, by the increasing specialization of what
34See ABA Model Rule 1.6(a) (allows waiver of confidentiality with informed consent).
35See, e.g., ABA Model Rule 1.7(b) (waiver of current client conflict of interest).
36The relationship between a negligence and an implied contract theory is discussed in Ronald E. Mallen &Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 8.7 (2007 ed.).
37652 P .2d 962 (W ash. Ct. App. 1982).
38Id. at 134. 16
most lawyers do.  None of us is competent in more than a few fields today.  In the same way,contract principles even govern client waiver of the requirement that a lawyer hold informationconfidential,34 as well as waiver of most conflicts of interest.35  My point, then, is that the lawyer-client relationship is becoming increasingly based on contract rather than immutable principles.36  Even in Washington state, where holding non-lawyers to a lawyer standard is wellestablished, that result works for the courts because both kinds of relationships are nowultimately contract-based.  In Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Co.,37for example, the clients wanted to borrow money, and to do so they needed to convey realproperty from their corporation to themselves.  Safeco, a company composed of non-lawyers,prepared the necessary deed and accomplished the change of title.  Later, the clients learned thatengaging in the transaction had tax consequences that the clients had not contemplated, so theysued Safeco for not telling them about those consequences.  The clients asserted that a lawyer atleast would have had to counsel the clients to get tax advice, but the court answered, “Thestandard of care or duty of an attorney or non-attorney closer is to close in accordance with theirinstructions.”38  Neither a lawyer nor a non-lawyer need give advice outside the narrow scope ofthe representation, the court said.  So long as either a lawyer or this non-lawyer did the particularwork for which it was hired, that was enough.
17
Ultimately, then, what I am arguing is that client relationships with non-lawyers shouldbe at least as open to negotiation and reasonable interpretation of the non-lawyer’s performancepromise as relationships with lawyers are becoming.  If that is the same as saying “act like alawyer, be judged like a lawyer,” so be it, but hopefully by the time we reach that conclusion weall will have enriched our understanding of the world clients face today in dealing with bothlawyers and non-lawyers. 
